

Date: 23rd January 2017

<REDACTED>
Governors
HMP Gartree
Gallow Field Road
Market Harborough
Leicestershire
LE16 7RP

Crown Premises Fire Inspection Group
Fire and Resilience Directorate
2nd Floor NW Fry Building
2 Marsham Street
London
SW1P 4DF

Our Ref: 3906/010/01

Please reply to:
<REDACTED>

Dear Governors,

The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (the Order)

Premises: HMP Gartree, Gallow Field Road, Market Harborough, Leicestershire

Please accept my apologies for the inaccuracies in the letter dated 16th January 2017. This letter replaces the 16th January version, which should be disregarded. I have also taken the opportunity to clarify the corresponding entries in the RAG Rating Form, and will be providing the revised form with this letter.

Following the fire safety inspection of the above premises on **10th and 11th January 2017**, I am writing to confirm my opinion that the identified individuals or groups of people would be at risk in case of fire. You will need to take action to ensure their safety.

In the event that a long-term solution cannot be implemented immediately, you will need to introduce interim measures to reduce the level of risk whilst longer-term measures are being prepared.

Fire safety measures are largely interactive, and fire risks can be controlled in many ways. Therefore, whilst the schedule refers to solutions you could adopt, I am not directing you to choose any one of them. It will be acceptable for you to implement any measures which achieve an appropriate standard of safety from fire.

Successful approaches to assessing and managing risk can be provided by accepted guidance, BS9999: 2008 or fire engineering calculations. Each of these requires the involvement of a person with comprehensive training or experience.

I have included additional information to assist you with planning what action to take:

1. The schedule identifies in each case the 'immediate' (i.e. what has its roots at the establishment) and the likely 'underlying' (i.e. corporate) causes of the failures identified during the inspection.
2. I attach the RAG Risk Rating form for the inspection. The form provides a clear risk-based decision framework and a risk score for individual RAG outcomes.
3. Final risk ratings for the fire safety measures and for key areas of fire safety management are also set out in bar charts at the end of the RAG rating form.

The RAG Risk Rating Form and the risk ratings will be revised during any follow-up inspection. This will be shown as a second bar on the chart, demonstrating the improvement made.

There is no formal right to appeal against this letter but if you would like clarification of its contents or to comment on your experience of the visit, please contact either me or the CPFIG Team Leader on cpfig@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk.

Yours faithfully

Crown Premises Fire Inspector
Crown Premises Fire Inspection Group
Office of the Chief Fire & Rescue Adviser

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Schedule

Premises: HMP Gartree, Gallow Field Road, Market Harborough, Leicestershire

File Number: 3906/010/01

Sheet: 1 of 4

This schedule should be read in conjunction with the CFRA letter dated 23rd January 2017.

1. MEASURES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF FIRE.			
Relevant article of the Order	Specific Failure to Comply with the Order	Steps considered necessary to remedy the failure to comply, including an illustrative example of a compliant measure	Action Plan Required
Articles 4(1)(a) & 8	<p>a. The sanctions' system is not used to deter prisoners from interfering with fire detectors.</p> <p>b. The induction programme does not include sufficient information about the consequences of tampering with fire detectors.</p> <p>c. Prisoners with a history of fire-setting and those at known risk of self-harm through fire are NOT located in cells where they are most appropriately safeguarded from fire:</p>	<p>a. Appropriate sanctions should be applied following any tampering with fire detectors.</p> <p>b. The prisoner induction should include all potentially useful messages for deterring tampering with fire detectors.</p> <p>c. Prisoners at known risk from fire should be located wherever possible in cells fitted with automatic fire detection, near to water misting equipment, and on the top landing of an atrium wing, in that order of preference</p> <p>Locating prisoners at known risk from fire in corridor approach without automatic fire detection and mechanical smoke control must be avoided.</p>	Within 28 days
9	<p>Immediate Cause of Failure: <i>The risk had not been correctly assessed</i></p>		
9	<p>Likely Underlying Safety Management Failure: <i>The arrangements for carrying out fire risk assessments do not ensure that there is a systematic process in place for identifying all relevant factors.</i></p>	<p>Safety Management Remedy: <i>The arrangements for carrying out fire risk assessments must ensure that there is a systematic process in place for identifying all relevant factors.</i></p>	

2. PROTECTION OF STAFF AND PRISONERS.

WARNING OF FIRE – MEASURES FOR FIRE-FIGHTING – RISK OF FIRE SPREAD – SECURING THE MEANS OF ESCAPE

Relevant article of the Order	Specific Failure to Comply with the Order	Steps considered necessary to remedy the failure to comply, including an illustrative example of a compliant measure	Action Plan Required
<p>Articles 4(1)(a) & 8</p> <p>9</p> <p>5</p> <p>9</p> <p>9</p> <p>9</p>	<p>c. Normal and/or emergency lighting doesn't provide sufficient illumination to safeguard prisoners and prison staff.</p> <p>Immediate Cause of Failure: <i>The risk had not been correctly assessed</i></p> <p>Likely Underlying Safety Management Failure: <i>The fire safety policy was not followed.</i></p> <p>d. Measures to reduce the spread of fire and smoke were inadequate.</p> <p>Immediate Cause of Failure: <i>The risk had not been correctly assessed</i></p> <p>Likely Underlying Safety Management Failure: <i>The arrangements for carrying out fire risk assessments do not ensure that there is a systematic process in place for identifying all relevant factors.</i></p> <p>e. The existing smoke control arrangements for enclosed landings / areas of corridor approach are inadequate to prevent smoke spread to other cells in the event of a cell fire i.e. all areas of corridor approach with the exception of <REDACTED>Wings.</p> <p>Immediate Cause of Failure: <i>The action plan did not set out a timescale for implementing corrective measures which was appropriate to the seriousness of the risk.</i></p>	<p>c. Appropriate illumination (lux level) from normal and the emergency lighting should be suitable for the task(s) undertaken at the premises during a fire emergency and should be in accordance with the relevant standards.</p> <p>Safety Management Remedy: <i>The fire safety policy must be followed.</i></p> <p>d. i) The fire loading in the corridor approach areas and enclosed landings should be limited to the minimum possible level compatible with the use of the building.</p> <p>ii) The fire resistance protecting the escape routes must control the spread of smoke where this could cause potential harm to persons using escape routes.</p> <p>Safety Management Remedy: <i>The arrangements for carrying out fire risk assessments must ensure that there is a systematic process in place for identifying all relevant factors.</i></p> <p>e. An effective mechanical smoke control system, based on engineering calculations and commissioned by a competent contractor, is required for all areas of corridor approach and enclosed landings (other than <REDACTED>Wings) to ensure that they remain tenable.</p> <p>Safety Management Remedy: <i>The arrangements in place for carrying out fire risk assessments must ensure that the level of risk is judged through comparison with relevant and accredited benchmarks of safety.</i></p>	<p>Within 28 days</p>

9	Likely Underlying Safety Management Failure: <i>The arrangements in place for carrying out fire risk assessments do not ensure that the level of risk is judged through comparison with relevant and accredited benchmarks of safety.</i>		
Relevant article of the Order	Insufficient information was available to evidence compliance in respect of the following matters:	Information required:	Date Required
Articles 4(1)(a) & 8	The smoke control system, when tested, did not appear to move air sufficiently to effectively clear smoke from the corridors on <REDACTED>wings in the event of a cell fire.	Evidence should be provided to demonstrate that the smoke control system operates effectively, for example from measurement of air movement during operation of the system.	Within 28 days

3. STAFF INSTRUCTIONS FOR ACTIONS IN THE EVENT OF FIRE.			
CELL FIRE RESPONSE.			
Relevant article of the Order	Specific Failure to Comply with the Order	Steps considered necessary to remedy the failure to comply, including an illustrative example of a compliant measure	Action Plan Required
Articles 4(1)(b), 7(6), 8 & 14 9 9	<p>a. The firefighting plan is not time based</p> <p>b. There is no a plan to use water mist equipment as soon as possible in every case, and always within every case within 5 minutes.</p> <p>Immediate Cause of Failure: <i>The risk had not been correctly assessed</i></p> <p>Likely Underlying Safety Management Failure: <i>The arrangements for carrying out fire risk assessments do not ensure that there is a systematic process in place for identifying all relevant factors.</i></p>	<p>a. The cell fire response plan must be time-based. Allowing for the predicted time for fire detection, the fire-fighting plan must ensure that water-mist inundation has been commenced by six minutes from ignition.</p> <p>b. The fire-fighting plan should be time-based, starting from when the fire is started, and taking into account the predicted time for fire detection. By six minutes from ignition – including the time for detection - the fire-fighting plan must ensure that water-mist inundation has been commenced.</p> <p>Safety Management Remedy: <i>The arrangements for carrying out fire risk assessments must ensure that there is a systematic process in place for identifying all relevant factors.</i></p>	Within 28 days

5. GENERAL MAINTENANCE.

Relevant article of the Order	Specific Failure to Comply with the Order	Steps considered necessary to remedy the failure to comply, including an illustrative example of a compliant measure	Action Plan Required
<p>Articles 4(1)(d), 7(6), 8 & 17</p> <p>17</p> <p>17</p>	<p>a. The responsible person has not ensured that the premises and any facilities, equipment and devices are subject to a suitable system of maintenance. E.g. remedial works to failures identified during the 2013 fixed wiring test; lack of information on fire doors.</p> <p>Immediate Cause of Failure: <i>Contractor had not carried out the remedial works</i></p> <p>Likely Underlying Safety Management Failure: <i>Inadequate maintenance arrangements</i></p>	<p>a. The responsible person must ensure that any facilities, equipment and devices are subject to a suitable maintenance programme and in an effective working order.</p> <p>Safety Management Remedy: <i>The arrangements for maintenance must ensure that the general fire precautions are subject to a suitable system of maintenance and are maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working order and in good repair.</i></p>	<p>Within 28 days</p>

Where appropriate, a plan may form part of this Schedule to illustrate the steps which, in the opinion of the Crown Premises Fire Inspection Group, need to be taken in order to meet the requirements of the Order.

Note: Notwithstanding any consultation with other enforcing authorities undertaken by the Crown Premises Fire Inspection Group, before you make any alterations to the workplace which constitutes building works you must apply to your local building control body (the local authority or an approved inspector) for any necessary approvals and to any other body which has a statutory interest in the workplace if their permission is required for those alterations to be made.